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Economic Analysis and Unconstitutional
Conditions: A Reply to Professor Epstein
HOWARD E. ABRAMS*
In his Foreword to last November's issue of the Harvard Law Re-
view, Professor Epstein tries to make sense of the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine.' That doctrine holds that a person may not,
under certain circumstances, be forced to choose between exercise of
a constitutional right and receipt of a government service, grant, or
other benefit.' For example, it has been held that unemployment
benefits provided by the government may not be conditioned on a
waiver of one's rights under the free exercise clause of the First
Amendment 3 and that the death penalty under the federal kidnap-
ping statute cannot be limited to defendants who insist on exercising
their right to a trial by jury.4 On the other hand, the doctrine did not
prevent the Bob Jones University from being forced to choose be-
tween its charitable tax status and its religiously motivated prohibi-
tion of interracial dating between students, 5 and it does not prohibit
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1. Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term - Foreword: Unconstitutional Condi-
tions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARv. L. REv. 4 (1988).
2. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10-8, at 681 &
n.29 (2d ed. 1988); Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional Rights, 35
COLuM. L. REV. 321 (1935); Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction
in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968); Note, Another Look at Unconsti-
tutional Conditions, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 144 (1968).
3. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
4. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968). See infra note 66 and accompa-
nying text.
5. Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). The Supreme
Court assumed arguendo that the University's ban on interracial dating was protected by
the free exercise clause of the First Amendment. See id. at 602 n.28.
plea bargaining, a practice which conditions a lighter sentence on a
defendant's waiver of the right to trial.6
Various commentators have tried to explain the doctrine on a re-
ward or punishment theory. 7 Such a theory holds that the waiver of
a constitutional right may be rewarded but that the exercise of a
constitutional right may not be punished. The wrinkle in such a the-
ory is the need to distinguish the imposition of a punishment from
the denial of a reward."
This distinction can be drawn if some appropriate baseline sepa-
rates rewards from punishments. If, for example, we can say that
one is entitled to this much and not more, then providing more is a
reward and providing less is a punishment. 9 Proposed baselines have
come from historical analysis,'0 balancing tests," societal norms,
12
and other sources. Professor Epstein seeks a baseline grounded in
economics, one that is "functional, not intuitive."' 3
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine is always implicated in
the same context. That is, the state offers a bargain in which the
offeree is free to choose between two outcomes: exercise of a consti-
tutional right and receipt of some government bounty. 4 When the
doctrine applies, the state is prohibited from offering the exchange
6. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
7. See, e.g., Abrams, Systemic Coercion: Unconstitutional Conditions in the
Criminal Law, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 128, 155-64 (1981); Van Alstyne, supra
note 2.
8. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 2, § 11-5 at 781. Professor Sullivan is particu-
larly harsh in her criticism of the reward or penalty approach. See Sullivan, Unconstitu-
tional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415, 1428-56 (1989). She ultimately concludes
that "[e]xcessive focus on whether unconstitutional conditions are coercive, and thus 'pe-
nalize' rights, has obscured the field. . . '[C]oercion' in this context is a conclusory label
masquerading as analysis." Id. at 1505-06.
9. But see Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges,
and the Production of Information, 1981 SuP. CT. REV. 309, 348 ("[A]ny doctrine that
draws a distinction between a price for the exercise of a right and a reward for the
nonexercise of a right probably begs all the important questions."). Cf. H.L.A. HART,
PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 6-7 (1968) (arguing that the distinction between a
non-penalty tax and a criminal fine is the violation of internalized standards of behavior).
10. Abrams, supra note 7, at 151.
11. Id. at 149-51.
12. See id. at 162-64; see also Epstein, supra note 1, at 69 (justifying the CIA's
prepublication censorship imposed on agents and former agents in part because "[t]he
restriction in question is no doubt similar to ones private employers impose upon
employees").
13. Epstein, supra note 1, at 13.
14. An alternative way of looking at the setting of unconstitutional conditions is to
focus on the government benefit and to observe that it is conditioned on waiver of a
constitutional right. From this perspective, the issue becomes one of equal protection: to
what extent may state benefits be given to one group but not another. Of course, the
defining characteristic of unconstitutional conditions in this context is that the state dis-
criminates on the basis of a mutable characteristic. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 8, at
1426. State benefits conditioned on immutable characteristics may classify but they can-
not coerce. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39 STAN. L.
REV. 1103, 1114 (1987).
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ab initio. Thus, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine imposes a
limitation on the generally beneficial freedom to contract.
Consistent with traditional economic reasoning, Professor Epstein
proposes to limit application of the unconstitutional conditions doc-
trine to situations in which market failure taints the bargaining pro-
cess. 5 The market failures identified by Professor Epstein are state-
owned monopolies, bargaining problems caused by coordinating col-
lective action, and exchanges producing significant externalities. Pro-
fessor Epstein sets out to show "how the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions does, and should, function in a variety of contexts as a
check against the political perils" of these market failures.'"
Unfortunately, Professor Epstein fails to carry through on his
promise. I show in Part I that Professor Epstein's economic analysis
is unsatisfactory in a variety of ways. With regard to monopoly, Pro-
fessor Epstein neither persuasively justifies his wholesale condemna-
tion of monopoly nor demonstrates how application of the unconsti-
tutional conditions doctrine responds to monopoly problems. His
abstract discussion of collective action is unremarkable and, unfortu-
nately, completely impractical. He fails to suggest a single context in
which the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions has or could allevi-
ate a problem of collective action. Finally, Professor Epstein relies
extensively on a poorly reasoned analysis of externalities. He neither
defines an "externality" properly nor applies the concept
evenhandedly.
One notable feature of Professor Epstein's analysis is his persis-
tent, if covert, reference to legislative and administrative motivation.
Any issue that relies on determination of motivation ultimately must
resist economic analysis because economics can only tell us what
people should do and why they might have done something. Eco-
nomics never can tell us why people did do something.17 At the very
least, Professor Epstein's tacit reliance on a motivational analysis un-
dermines his search for a "functional, not intuitive" solution.
Because determinations of motivation inevitably are intuitive, Pro-
fessor Epstein's search for a functional approach is doomed. I pursue
in Part II an alternative economic analysis of the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine which, by showing that motivation must be the
15. Limiting restrictions on freedom to contract to market failure is a mainstay of
legal economic analysis. See, e.g., R. CORNES & T. SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTER-
NALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS 3-5 (1986); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALY-
SIS OF LAW § 13.1 (3d ed. 1986).
16. Epstein, supra note 1, at 15.
17. See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
linchpin of the doctrine, identifies the limited role economics can
play in this context. Application of the doctrine must turn in each
case on the administrative or legislative motivation underlying the
particular challenged condition.
A threshold problem with the doctrine of unconstitutional condi-
tions is its name; by calling a condition unconstitutional we have al-
ready rejected its legitimacy. Unfortunately, there is no accepted
name for generic conditions that might or might not be unconstitu-
tional. In another context I have referred to such conditions-that is,
conditions imposed on the exercise of a constitutional right-as "sys-
temic coercion."'18 While that name also carries with it a certain
level of condemnation, at least it does not express a prejudgment as
to the constitutional issue. For want of a better name, I shall con-
tinue to use the term "systemic coercion" here.
As we shall see, the problems posed by systemic coercion highlight
the limitations of economic analysis. Ultimately, the propriety of a
condition imposed on the exercise of a constitutional right turns on
the reasons motivating the condition. "Unfortunately, no amount of
economic analysis can do more than indicate why an action might
have been taken,20 and if a legislative action is to be set aside as
constitutionally infirm, more than a suspicion of improper motivation
must be required.2'
What makes the economic analysis of systemic coercion particu-
larly frustrating is that the problem can be recast as that of monitor-
ing the behavior of public officials.12 Economic reasoning has been
especially powerful in this context. 23 Unfortunately, the monitoring
problem underlying systemic coercion resists traditional economic
analysis because, in this context, those who would benefit from the
monitoring cannot protect themselves.
I. PROFESSOR EPSTEIN'S ANALYSIS
A. Monopoly Market Failure
Professor Epstein begins his discussion of monopolies by identify-
ing three "social losses" caused by monopolistic behavior as com-
pared with behavior under perfect competition. The first loss is that
resulting directly from the super-competitive price charged by a mo-
nopolist: "[W]hen the monopolist raises his price he prevents some
18. Abrams, supra note 7, at 134.
19. See infra notes 102, 105-08 and accompanying text.
20. See infra note 55.
21. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1968); see Abrams, supra
note 7, at 142-49. '
22. See cases cited infra notes 102-12.
23. See Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcON. 305 (1976).
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mutually beneficial exchanges. . . . The benefits of that foregone ex-
change are thus one form of loss created by monopoly.
24
The second social loss identified by Professor Epstein as caused by
monopoly involves the various costs incurred by a monopolist in ob-
taining the monopoly. These costs-such as buying out a competitor
or buying government legislation to eliminate competitors-would
not necessarily be incurred in a competitive economy.25 The third
social loss encompasses the transaction costs incurred by the monop-
olist and his customers of engaging in strategic bargaining, behavior
that would not be productive (and so would not be incurred) 26 were
there a set, competitive price for the monopolists goods.
Figure 1 illustrates the first social loss identified by Professor Ep-




24. Epstein, supra note 1, at 16.
25. See Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON.
807 (1975); Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. OF ECON. AND
MANAGEMENT SC. 1 (1971).
26. However, even nonproductive costs will be incurred if the actors believe they
could be productive. Thus, it is knowledge of the competitive economy rather than the
competitive economy itself which eliminates strategic bargaining. The importance of ac-
curate information is captured by the game of chicken. In chicken, two players drive
automobiles toward each other at high speed. The loser of the game is the player who
swerves first. If both players insist on not swerving, they crash and both die. The payoff
matrix of chicken can be represented as follows:
Swerve Don't Swerve
Swerve 0, 0 -5, 10
Don't Swerve 10, -5 -20, -20
The winning strategy in this game is for a player to break his steering wheel and throw it
out the window. Once the opposing driver sees that a crash cannot be avoided unless he
swerves-that is, chickens out-he will do so to avoid the accident fatal to both. This
strategy works not simply by disabling one's vehicle but by advertising the disability to
the opposing party.
27. For a similar discussion of the standard view of monopolies, see R. POSNER,
supra note 15, § 9.3 at 254.
monopolist's good that would be charged in a fully competitive econ-
omy, and Pm is the price charged by the monopolist. Qc is the quan-
tity demanded at price Pc, while Qm is the quantity demanded at
price Pm.
Gains from trade arise from the increase in value of what one
party receives in excess of the value that party gives up. For a con-
sumer, such an excess will exist only if the consumer values the item
received more than the market values the item. This excess, called
"consumer surplus," alternatively can be defined as the value that
each consumer places on the received good, as measured by the max-
imum amount that the consumer would pay for that good, in excess
of the amount charged.28 In a competitive economy, the consumer
surplus equals the areas in Figure 1 identified as X, Y and Z. In the
monopolistic economy, consumer surplus equals only area X.
The corresponding "producer surplus" is the excess of price
charged over the cost of the good. In a competitive economy, no part
of X, Y or Z in Figure I constitutes producer surplus. In a monopo-
listic economy, the producer surplus includes area Y.
The social loss resulting from a monopoly is represented by area Z
in Figure 1. Area Z is that part of the consumer surplus in the com-
petitive economy not captured by consumers or by the producer in
the monopolistic economy. Area Y does not represent a social loss
even though its value is lost by consumers because it is captured by
the monopolist; that is, area Y represents value transferred from con-
sumers to the producer as a result of the monopoly. Thus, the social
loss from the monopoly-the excess of the consumer surplus in a
competitive economy over the consumer plus producer surpluses in
the monopolistic economy-is only area Z.1'
It certainly is true that a monopoly may, under some circum-
stances, produce a social loss as that term is used by Professor Ep-
stein.30 Is that necessarily bad? If the shift from a monopoly to a
competitive economy made consumers better off while not negatively
impacting the monopolist, the competitive economy surely would be
preferable to the monopoly. That is, the competitive economy would
be Pareto superior to the monopoly.3
28. See A. ALCHIAN & A. ALLEN. EXCHANGE & PRODUCTION 17-18 (3d ed.
1983); C. LINDSAY, APPLIED PRICE THEORY 288 (1984).
29. This lost consumer surplus assumes that the monopolist is unable to price-dis-
criminate. If perfect discrimination is possible, there is no welfare loss attributable to
monopoly. See infra note 36.
30. Id.
31. See Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 509, 512-13 (1980). A Pareto efficient state of affairs is one in which no individual
can be made better off without inflicting a loss on at least one other person. Thus, one
situation is Pareto superior to another if all individuals are as well or better off in the
first situation then they are in the second.
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However, because a competitive economy includes the transforma-
tion of a producer surplus into a consumer surplus, it is not Pareto
superior to a monopoly. That is, while a competitive economy makes
consumers better off, it makes the monopolist worse off. Accordingly,
a society that acts only on the basis of unanimous consent would not
voluntarily replace the monopoly with a competitive economy.
3 2
The only way that one could characterize the transition from a
monopoly to a competitive economy as a net benefit would be by
comparing the gain to consumers against the loss to the monopolist
and holding that the gain is more. To be sure, the dollar magnitude
of the consumers' gain exceeds the dollar magnitude of the monopo-
list's loss. Yet, that fact alone does not allow us to conclude that
society as a whole is better off in the competitive economy than with
the monopoly.33
Consider the following hypothetical experiment. Suppose on a cer-
tain isolated island the inhabitants consider coconuts to be especially
valuable. One day a strange ship arrives and the captain of that ship
makes the following offer to the natives on the island: if one particu-
lar native (say, A) willingly destroys one of his coconuts, the captain
will give two coconuts to another native (say, B). However, B must
agree not to give a coconut or anything else of value to A.
Should the natives agree to this transaction to improve their soci-
ety overall? Surely B will support the transaction, for B obtains a
direct benefit as a result. Furthermore, all the other natives (exclud-
ing A) presumably will favor the transaction because it increases the
total supply of goods in the native economy, and they may share in
that increased wealth. For example, B might increase his spending
on luxury goods if he suddenly received two fresh coconuts, and the
weavers on the island thus might share in the riches.
But is the society as a whole better off?- 4 Surely A is not, since it
32. On the importance of the unanimity principle, see, e.g., J. BUCHANAN & G.
TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 85-96 (1965); D. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 19-
27 (1979).
33. Moving from state A to state B is "Kaldor-Hicks" efficient if the winners from
the move benefit more than the losers lose. See Bebchuk, The Pursuit of a Bigger Pie:
Can Everyone Expect a Bigger Slice?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 671, 671 n.2 (1980). Thus, a
competitive economy is Kaldor-Hicks efficient. For a general criticism of the Kaldor-
Hicks criterion, see Coleman, supra note 31, at 519-20, 532-39. Professor Sen has de-
scribed the Kaldor-Hicks criterion (and similar extensions of Pareto optimality) as "ei-
ther unconvincing or redundant." A. SEN, ON ETHICS & ECONOMICS 33 n.4 (1987).
34. Society is nothing but a collection of iridividuals, and for society to be better
off, each member of that society must be at least no worse off. See generally J.
BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, supra note 32, at 11-15.
is A who paid for the gains enjoyed by others. Some of B's riches
may trickle down to A, but in the absence of a direct transfer from B
to A (strictly prohibited by the terms of the visiting captain), it is
unlikely that A will recoup the entire coconut he has been forced to
destroy. Society as a whole includes A, and since A is worse off,
society as a whole is not better off. The best we can say is that some
members of society are better off and some worse. The transaction
increases the social pie, but that is no solace to anyone who fails to
get a slice.
So, too, in going from a monopoly to a competitive economy, con-
sumers become better off at the expense of the monopolist. Indeed,
those who would share the monopolist's bounty-favorite suppliers,
perhaps, or employees or relatives-also are worse off. We simply
cannot assert that society as a whole benefits from the elimination of
a monopoly unless we are prepared to value the monopolist's welfare
less than that of consumers.
If a transition from one economic state to another increases the
social pie, the winners might be able to compensate the losers so that
everyone profits from the event. In the hypothetical coconut experi-
ment, such compensation was explicitly prohibited by the terms of
the experiment. Might it be the case in the real world that such
compensation from winners to losers similarly is impossible?
Somewhat surprisingly, the answer is that, in some cases, it is ac-
tually impossible. Consider the monopoly. We have seen from Figure
1 that in going from a monopoly to a competitive economy, the mo-
nopolist loses Y while consumers gain Y and Z. Why don't consum-
ers offer to pay the monopolist some amount between Y and Y + Z
to reduce his price to the competitive level?
Even assuming that consumers can act cohesively with zero trans-
action costs, they still will be unable to agree on a group plan to
subsidize the monopolist. Suppose, for example, that the consumers
were to agree to pay S1 dollars per unit to the monopolist to have
him lower his price to the competitive level. In effect, the consumers
will have agreed to pay Pc + SI per unit. 35
Not all consumers will go along with this agreement. For some
consumers, the consumer surplus at price Pc is less than S 1, meaning
that for these consumers, the monopolist's product is not worth Pc +
S1. Accordingly, these consumers will refuse to participate in the
scheme and the burden of subsidizing the monopolist will fall on a
smaller group.
Because the group is smaller, the amount per unit that each will
have to pay to the monopolist must increase, say to S2. Now, some
35. This example is subject to the condition that Y5NS1_(Y+Z), where N is
the number of consumers agreeing to make the additional payment.
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consumers who would have been willing to pay Pc + Si will refuse
to pay Pc + S2. Thus, the group of consumers willing to subsidize
the monopolist will further decrease and the necessary subsidy per
unit will rise to S3. This process will continue until the subsidy
equals Pm-Pc. That is, the effective unit price to the consumers will
increase to Pm and the monopoly conditions will recur.36 Were there
a lower effective price at which the monopolist could sell his goods
without losing any part of his monopoly profit, the monopolist would
adopt that price unilaterally.
To be sure, it would seem that by netting gains to one group
against losses to another, we ought to be able to arrive at a meaning-
ful social statistic. Proponents of welfare economics have been doing
just this for many years.3 7 The theoretical arguments against the le-
gitimacy of social welfare economics are well known and need not be
belabored here.38 For our purposes, it is sufficient to note that Pro-
36. This example assumes that the consumers must divide the amount they pay to
the monopolist in proportion to their consumption of the monopolist's output. If they
could instead divide the total payment in proportion to each consumer's share of the
consumer surplus, they could arrange to pay the monopolist an amount equal to area Y
in return for the monopolist reducing his price to the competitive price. They would
thereby regain the consumer surplus (area Z in Figure 1). However, this method of di-
viding the payment to the monopolist among the consumers is the precise equivalent of
perfect price discrimination by the monopolist. It is well known that no social loss obtains
despite the existence of a monopoly if the monopolist price discriminates. See, e.g., A.
ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, supra note 28, at 354-57; C. LINDSAY, supra note 28, at 589-
598; H. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIc ANALYSIS 84-85 (2d ed. 1984). Thus, consumers can
eliminate the monopoly social loss only when the monopolist also could eliminate it
through unilateral effort.
37. See C. LINDSAY, supra note 28, at 556-58.
38. See, e.g., J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, supra note 32, at 92-93; C. LINDSAY,
supra note 28, at 554-64; Coleman, supra note 31, at 532-39. The strongest criticisms
come from the most technically sophisticated. See, e.g., L. SAVAGE, THE FOUNDATIONS
OF STATISTICS 95-97 (2d rev. ed. 1972). In his lecture on Ethics and Economics, Profes-
sor Sen makes the surprising comment that "[iut is, of course, possible to argue that
interpersonal comparisons of utility make no sense and are indeed totally meaningless-a
position I find hard to defend." A SEN, supra note 33, at 30, n.2. What Professor Sen
apparently means, however, is that modern economics has too rigidly accepted utilitari-
anism and its underlying notion that rational behavior must be self-interested. See id. at
33-34, 40-46. Professor Sen recognizes that modern economics treats "[p]areto optimal-
ity as the only criterion of judgment." Id. at 34.
Professor Sen's apparent willingness to embrace some form of interpersonal compari-
sons of utility can be traced to a mistake he made in his 1969 book, Collective Choice
and Social Welfare. In that book, Professor Sen says:
One way of giving meaning to [interpersonal comparisons] is to consider
choices between being person A in social state X or being person B in social
state Y. For example we could ask: "Would you prefer to be Mr. A, an unem-
ployed laborer, in state X, or Mr. B, a well-paid employed engineer, in state
Y?" While the answer to the question does involve interpersonal comparisons
fessor Epstein's characterization of monopolies as always socially un-
desirable would be supported by consumers and disputed by monopo-
lists and potential monopolists. Thus, the monopoly welfare loss
condemned by Professor Epstein is no more profound than any other
factional dispute over division of the social pie. Moreover, in the con-
text of systemic coercion, the monopolist is the government and thus
indirectly society in general. Ignoring the surplus loss to the monopo-
list-and through it to society generally-is, thus, particularly inap-
propriate in this context.
Evidence of this flaw in Professor Epstein's treatment of monopo-
lies appears in his analysis of conditions imposed on the right of for-
eign corporations to do business within a state.39 For example, con-
sider a state that forbids foreign corporations from doing business
within the state unless the corporation waives its right to remove
civil actions to the federal courts.40 This condition is burdensome to
foreign corporations, but if the profits from doing business within the
state outweigh the burden, corporations will capitulate. The issue ad-
dressed by Professor Epstein is whether foreign corporations can
constitutionally be put to such a choice in the first place.
Professor Epstein treats this situation as an instance of monopoly
market failure because each state has plenary power to exclude or
admit foreign corporations within its borders. 41 Local consumers
both gain and lose from the condition: they gain to the extent that
their civil actions cannot be removed to the federal courts (thereby
enjoying some amount of forum shopping), and they lose to the ex-
tent that some foreign corporations refuse to do business within the
state because of the condition. According to Professor Epstein, these
gains and losses plausibly offset one another." Similarly, local busi-
A. SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE 5 (1969).
Yet, in the situation posed by Professor Sen, there is no interpersonal comparison. One
person (the reader) is asked to compare two possible states of the world. We can re-
phrase the choice offered by Sen as: would you prefer the bundle of goods associated with
Mr. A's life or the bundle of goods associated with Mr. B's life? So long as one person
makes that comparison, no interpersonal comparison of welfare is required.
There would be interpersonal comparisons if Professor Sen meant to compare A's life,
as felt and enjoyed by A, with B's life, as felt and enjoyed by B. If the reader is asked to
evaluate A's life from A's perspective-a perspective necessarily including A's memories
rather than those of the reader-the reader has no way to make the evaluation because it
must be made by someone with A's values, preferences and history. Indeed, the possibil-
ity that I might be magically transformed into someone else complete with his or her
memories and lacking mine is epistemological nonsense properly excised by Occam's ra-
zor: if it happened, how would I or anyone else know? See generally R. NozicK, PHILO-
SOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 29-47 (1981).
39. Epstein, supra note 1, at 31-38.
40. See Terral v. Burke Construction Co., 257 U.S. 529 (1922), invalidating such
a condition.
41. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868). See generally Epstein, supra
note 1, at 32-33.
42. Epstein, supra note 1, at 36.
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nesses both gain and lose: they gain from the decrease in competition
and they lose to the extent that competition among their suppliers is
reduced. For foreign corporations, though, the condition imposes
only a loss. To eliminate a net social loss-the costs imposed on the
foreign corporation-Professor Epstein would prohibit imposition of
the condition.43
Although the condition may actually be illegitimate, Professor Ep-
stein's analysis is not helpful. If the benefits and burdens to local
consumers and businesses fully offset one another, the condition
would not be imposed." The only rational explanation for the condi-
tion is that local consumers or businesses obtain some net benefit
from it. That being the case, voiding the condition works a shift of
value from local residents to foreign corporations. Professor Epstein's
analysis of monopolies gives no justification for enforcing such a
transfer.
Professor Epstein at least tacitly recognizes this criticism of his
analysis when he states that "it becomes difficult to use a simple
Pareto test" in this situation.45 Yet difficulty exists only because Pro-
fessor Epstein insists on expanding economic analysis beyond its le-
gitimate scope. Because the two economic states are not Pareto com-
parable, neither state is preferable to the other absent an arbitrary
social welfare calculus. However, rather than accepting the implica-
tions of this "difficulty," Professor Epstein argues:
Now the object of the inquiry is to maximize the total cooperative surplus
from the [government imposition of the condition]. Some effort must be
made to compare the size of the gains obtained by each of the rival groups,
and for this task one convenient approach is to accept only conditions that
tend to advance the welfare of all groups pro rata, as opposed to those hav-
ing a differential effect.4"
Professor Epstein's effort is doomed to failure because there is no
meaningful way to "compare the size of the gains obtained by each
of the rival groups."4 Furthermore, even if there were some sensible
way to make such a comparison, favoring "only conditions that tend
43. Id. at 36-37.
44. Of course, public choice theory tells us that the condition might be imposed
even if it imposes a net loss on local residents if some sufficiently focused subset of locals
will benefit from the regulation. See, e.g., M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE Ac-
TION 111-31 (1971).
45. Epstein, supra note 1, at 25.
46. Id.
47. While the dollar magnitude of the gains can be measured, that comparison
lacks meaning. See infra p. 376 (discussion following Table II).
to advance the welfare of all groups pro rata" is totally arbitrary.48
No justification for this arbitrariness is offered other than its
"convenience."
This arbitrariness also appears in Professor Epstein's treatment of
possible conditions imposed on the use of a public highway. A state
might condition use of the highway in such a way as to favor one
group over another (by, for example, imposing a use tax only on
truckers or only on non-truckers), or it might impose only general
conditions (such as weight limitations and general traffic rules) af-
fecting all groups equally.4 9
"[T]he trick," according to Professor Epstein, "is to fashion a test
that can distinguish good conditions from bad ones." 0 Two condi-
tions he considers are (1) a requirement that all users of the highway
agree to answer for their torts, and (2) a condition imposed only on
commercial haulers that they agree to be bound by the restrictions
applicable to common carriers." Professor Epstein concludes that
the former condition "seems to be [of] the benevolent kind,""2 an
unsurprising conclusion in light of his "convenient approach" favor-
ing only conditions of general applicability.
The latter condition is condemned by Professor Epstein as "the
type of condition that reduces the total size of the social surplus, by
allowing it to be redistributed through factional intrigue. '5 3 Yet, it
might be equally inoffensive. For example, it might be administra-
tively unworkable to define "common carrier" more precisely than as
including all commercial haulers. Or it might be the case that com-
mercial haulers are less likely to obey general traffic rules because
the size of their vehicles makes them less susceptible to injury. To
encourage recognition of the rights of others, these haulers might be
subject to more stringent liability such as that imposed on common
carriers.5
4
Of course, the restriction might be nothing but the result of fac-
tional intrigue. Let us assume, arguendo, that if true, that would be
48. Cf. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Com-
mon Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487, 498-99 (1980) (arguing against Rawl's
selection of the maximum criterion).
49. The characterization of these rules as "general," a characterization adopted by
Professor Epstein, is itself value-laden. Would a decision to prohibit all public funding of
sickle cell anemia research be general because it formally affects all citizens equally or
should it be treated as targeted toward blacks because of its disproportionate impact? Is
it true, as Professor Epstein apparently would assert, that a rule forbidding rich as well
as poor from sleeping under park benches is completely general and does not discriminate
on the basis of wealth? See also Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Nega-
tive Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1293, 1304-14 (1984).
50. Epstein, supra note 1, at 25.
51. Id. at 47-54.
52. Id. at 25.
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., S. SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 73-75 (1987).
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sufficient to strike it down. The point then is that what invalidates
the condition is not its effect but the motive behind its enactment.
Unfortunately, no amount of economic analysis will tell us what
motivates a piece of legislation. 5
Motivational analysis is an obvious response to the systemic coer-
cion problem. Motivational analysis accepts the basic logic of the
greater-includes-the-lesser theory that the government may condition
the receipt of benefits on the waiver of a constitutional right. But its
response to the problem is that this power, like any other, may not
be exercised to further some invidious purpose. 6 However, motiva-
tional analysis is fraught with difficulty. For example, consider a
statute which disallows tax deductions for contributions to charitable
organizations that engage in political lobbying. Such a statute might
be an attempt by existing legislators to undermine organizations
seeking political change. If so, presumably the statute should be in-
validated.5 7 On the other hand, the statute might represent a belief
that the general taxing power should not be used to subsidize lobby-
ing activities of narrow, special interests, presumably a legitimate
goal of the legislative power.58
55. For example, consider the Glass-Steagall Act, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933).
While the avowed purpose of the Act was to improve the stability of financial banks, its
effect has been to profit investment bankers at the expense of the consuming public by
reducing competition in the underwriting market. Yet, one cannot conclude from this
alone that the Glass-Steagall Act was disingenuously intended from the outset to protect
a narrow special interest: it might have been "a misguided, albeit benign, attempt to
accomplish its formally articulated objectives." Macey, Special Interest Groups Legisla-
tion and the Judicial Function: The Dilemma of Glass-Steagall, 33 EMORY L.J. 1, 16
(1984). Professor Macey ultimately concludes that "the Act is [not] simply a result of
congressional error." Id. That conclusion rests in part on his observation that the articu-
lated objectives of the Act could have been accomplished through less anti-competitive
legislation. Id. However, that explanation cuts both for and against Professor Macey's
conclusion.
The ultimate basis of Professor Macey's conclusion that the Glass-Steagall Act was
intended to be special interest legislation seems to be that the Act benefits investment
bankers-a small, focused group-at the expense of consumers-a large, diverse group.
Id. at 19-20. To be sure, coalition theory predicts that small groups will exploit large
groups. See, e.g., M. OLSON, supra note 44, at 141-48. However, to move from that
general prediction to the conclusion that the Glass-Steagall Act is an instance of such
exploitation rather than a misguided legislative attempt to benefit the general public is a
leap of faith rather than of logic.
56. Even Justice Holmes used motivational analysis tQ avoid the greater-includes-
the-lesser line of reasoning. See Kreimer, supra note 49, at 1329, discussing Western
Union Telegraph Co. v. Foster, 247 U.S. 105 (1918).
57. Cf. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1960) (invalidating restrictions on mi-
nority party candidates).
58. Cf. Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947) (up-
holding Hatch Act conditioning federal subsidies to state governments on state employ-
How should a court determine the motivation underlying the legis-
lation? 59 Because the challenge is to the legislation as written rather
than as applied, presumably it is the legislature's motivation that is
relevant.60 But just what is the motivation of a collective body? A
court might be able to determine what motivated a particular legis-
lator to vote a particular way,61 but what would such a finding tell
us? Is one impermissible motive enough to invalidate a law, or must
a majority of legislators have harbored bad intentions? 2
A court might forego true motivational analysis in favor of an ob-
jective proxy. If an avowed legislative purpose could be accomplished
by a more narrowly tailored law, it is reasonable to treat the legisla-
tion as intended to accomplish its broader effect.6 3 For example, con-
sider a statute that denies unemployment benefits to individuals un-
available for gainful employment Monday through Saturday. For an
individual whose religion forbids work on Saturday, this statute
forces a choice between receipt of unemployment benefits and free
exercise of religion. Should the statute be invalidated?
64
The statute might be defended as a legitimate attempt to limit
unemployment benefits to those individuals actively seeking employ-
ment. From this perspective, the statute's negative impact on some
individual's exercise of religion is unintended and incidental.65 How-
ever, the goal of limiting unemployment benefits to job-seeking ap-
plicants could be accomplished without burdening religious practices.
For example, unemployment compensation might be limited to appli-
ees' abstinence from politics).
59. The motivations advanced, and accepted, for suspect legislation defy credibil-
ity. For example, Justice Harlan accepted a prohibition against the payment of vested
social security benefits to deported communists on the theory that the statute was not
intended to punish communists for their political views but rather was intended to help
this country's balance of trade. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 612 (1960). See
generally Kreimer, supra note 49, at 1337-38.
60. An as-applied challenge to systemic coercion arises, for example, when a stat-
ute grants discretion to a public official who then exercises that discretion to induce the
waiver of a constitutional right. For example, a judge might agree to sentence reduction
if a criminal defendant pleads guilty. The systemic coercion challenge to such a practice
is not that the granting of sentencing discretion to judges violates the constitution but
rather that one judge has exercised that discretion improperly.
61. Although determining the motivation of an individual is never an easy task,
special problems face a court trying to determine the motivation of a legislator. Can
legislators be required to testify concerning their motivation? Or would such enforced
testimony violate a separation-of-powers concern? Would a failure to testify warrant an
inference of an impermissible motive or would such an inference impermissibly burden
the legislators' right to be free from challenge for their legislative actions? See U.S.
Const., art. I, § 6 (speech or debate clause); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. (13 Otto)
168, 204 (1880) (protecting all "things generally in a session of [Congress] by one of its
members in relation to the business before it.").
62. See Kreimer, supra note 49, at 1335.
63. See Abrams, supra note 7, at 146-49.
64. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
65. See Kreimer, supra note 49, at 1339.
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cants available for employment six days (or a set number of hours)
per week. Because the statute's burden on the free exercise of reli-
gion is needless, it should be invalidated as if the burden were
intended .
66
Even assuming that legislative motivation can be defined and as-
certained, courts are reluctant to invalidate a statute solely on moti-
vational grounds. In theory, an insidious motivation ought to be suffi-
cient justification for invalidating a statute. Even if the statute could
be reenacted with purer legislative motives, it might not be, and in-
validating the statute forces the legislature to face that question.
Given the difficulties of proof, however, should a court void a statute
"essentially on the ground that it is unwise legislation which Con-
gress had the undoubted power to enact and which could be reen-
acted in its exact form if the same or another legislator made a
'wiser' speech about it.'' 67 When faced with this question, the Su-
preme Court has consistently answered "no.11
68
Invalidating systemic coercion if improperly motivated also raises
a question of remedies. If benefit B has been unconstitutionally con-
ditioned on the waiver of right R, should the court rewrite the stat-
ute by deleting the waiver requirement or should the statute be
voided in toto? For example, the federal kidnapping statute imposed
the death penalty on a defendant only if the jury recommended it.
69
Accordingly, a defendant could ensure a maximum sentence of life
imprisonment by pleading guilty, whereas exercising the right to jury
trial risked imposition of a death sentence. If a court determines that
the statute unfairly coerces the waiver of a constitutional right, what
should it do? One possibility is to prohibit imposition of the death
penalty -regardless of the defendant's plea or jury recommendation,
66. Compare United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968), where the Supreme
Court invalidated that portion of the federal kidnaping statute which provided for the
death penalty only if recommended by the jury. Because a jury could not be empaneled
solely to determine punishment, the statute limited the possibility of death to those de-
fendants who insisted on exercising on their right to trial by jury. The statute chilled a
constitutional right unnecessarily and was therefore unconstitutional. Id. at 582.
67. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 467, 384 (1968).
68. Id. at 383-84 (1968); accord, Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-25;
Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960).
69. The statute read:
Whoever knowingly transports . . . any person who has been unlawfully kid-
napped . . . and held for ransom . . . shall be punished (1) by death if the
kidnapped person has not been liberated unharmed, and if the verdict of the
jury shall so recommend, or (2) by imprisonment for any term of years or for
life, if the death penalty is not imposed.
18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1966), amended by Pub. L. No. 92-539, 86 Stat. 1072 (1972).
but an equally viable alternative is to permit imposition of the death
penalty even in the absence of a jury recommendation. While the
Supreme Court chose the former course, it gave no explanation for
its rejection of the latter. 0
An even more difficult case is posed by systemic coercion involving
a financial benefit. For example, suppose a state offered $100 to
every resident aged eighteen through twenty-one who agreed not to
vote in a forthcoming senatorial election. 71 Presumably the statute is
invalid, but in holding it invalid, must a court require the legislature
to pay to all eighteen to twenty-one year-old residents $100, whether
or not they vote? If so, what if the state legislature refuses to fund
the program? Presumably the proper approach is to invalidate the
statute and deny compensation to all.
Although Professor Epstein never explicitly embraces motivational
analysis (presumably because it is intuitive rather than functional),
he uses it when it suits his purpose to do so. Take his discussion of
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission.72 At issue in that case
was a decision of the California Coastal Commission to condition a
building permit on a grant by the landowner of an easement to the
state. The land involved was beachfront property on which sat a di-
lapidated house. The owner sought permission to raze the house and
build a larger one. The Commission conditionally approved the con-
struction and required the landowner to grant to the state a lateral
easement for the benefit of the public at large. Under conventional
wisdom the police power would have allowed the Commission to re-
ject the building permit unconditionally to protect the public viewing
access to the ocean.73
Justice Scalia invalidated the condition, and Professor Epstein ap-
plauds the decision. Professor Epstein sees the transaction as an at-
tempt by California to make an end run around the takings clause of
the Constitution. According to Professor Epstein, a basic purpose of
the takings clause is to ensure that an interest in private property is
not taken by the government unless the government values the prop-
erty more highly than does the property's owner.74 The takings
70. See United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
71. The benign justification for such a statute might be that the state feels individ-
uals under age 21 are, in general, too immature to vote. Recognizing that citizens over
age 18 cannot be denied the right to vote, the state is merely trying to buy that which its
young citizens should be free to sell or retain. Cf. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford,
155 Mass. 216, 216, 29 N.E. 517, 517-18 (1892) ("There are few employments for hire
in which the servant does not agree to suspend his constitutional rights of free speech as
well as of idleness by the implied terms of his contract.").
72, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
73. The Court in Nollan assumed but did not decide that the Coastal Commission
had the power to insist on a viewing easement without compensating the landowner. 483
U.S. at 835-36.
74. Professor Epstein actually says that a "basic social purpose" of the takings
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clause, so Professor Epstein asserts, imposes a "constraint against
resource misallocation. 75
The short answer to this assertion is that the takings clause plays
no such role. Note first that if the only function of the takings clause
were to prevent Professor Epstein's "resource misallocation," then
there is no reason why the state is forced to pay the landowner for
the property taken; a payment to the federal government or anyone
else would serve equally well.76 More generally, payment under the
takings clause does not ensure that the state values the property
taken more highly than does the property owner. To see how Profes-
sor Epstein has erred on this point, we must determine precisely
what conclusions can be drawn from exchanges generally and from
exchanges based on the condemnation power in particular.
When two persons voluntarily engage in an exchange of property,
each party profits in the sense that what is received is perceived to be
more valuable than what is transferred. Thus, from a voluntary ex-
change we always can infer something about the way in which each
of the two parties values the items exchanged. Can we also infer
anything about the value one party places on one of the items ex-
changed as compared with the other party's valuation of the same
item? Not necessarily. For example, suppose that P owns object X
and the Q owns object Y. P and Q will exchange X and Y under
either of the following two situations.
clause is "to ensure that an interest in property will pass into government hands only if it
is worth more to the government . . . than its market value in private hands." Epstein,
supra note I, at 62. However, he adds that "[i]deally, the state should be required to pay
not the market value, but the subjective value that the individual attaches to the prop-
erty." Id. at 62 n.167. It is this latter qualification that is treated in the text and in this
Reply as Professor Epstein's assertion. He in fact asserts that his argument "does not
depend on which standard of private valuation is used." Id. Further, when he comes to
apply this interpretation of the takings clause in the context of Nollan, he condemns the
case because it does not permit us to determine "whether the value of the lateral ease-
ment to the state is greater than its value to the owner," id. at 62 (emphasis added), and
at no time compares the state's value to the market value..
75. Epstein, supra note 1, at 62.
76. Payment to the landowner ensures that the few are not sacrificed to the many.
L. TRIBE, supra note 2, § 9-6.
Table I
Situation One X Y
P's Value 5 9
Q's Value 6 6
Situation Two
P's Value 5 9
Q's Value 4 1
In the first situation, each object ends up in the hands of the party
valuing it most highly. In the second situation, though, object X ends
up in Q's hands with a value to Q of 4 even though it was worth 5 in
P's hands prior to the exchange. Thus, the exchange permits us to
make no interpersonal comparisons of value. If we add a third party
to the economy, our available inferences are reduced even further. In
the two-person economy, the parties will engage in trade until no
remaining trade can increase both welfares. However, consider the
case of a three-person economy in which P owns object X, Q owns
object Y, and R owns object Z. Assume further that each values the
three objects as set out in the Table II.
Table II
Most Valuable Second Most Valuable Least Valuable
P Z X Y
Q X Y Z
R Y Z X
Each party ought to end up with their most preferred object. Yet,
there is no set of two-party exchanges to obtain that result. For ex-
ample, P will part with his initial endowment of X only to obtain
more favored Z, but Z is owned by R who, because of the low value
he places on X, will decline the exchange. 77 Thus, in the multi-party
economy we are unable to infer from the absence of exchange that
there are no opportunities for productive bargain.
If we introduce money into this economy, we can free it from its
pairing difficulty. For example, P can sell object X for cash and then
buy object Z from R. R can then use the cash to purchase object Y
from Q, and Q will then complete the cycle by returning the cash to
the market in exchange for object X.
Introducing money into the economy seems to offer the benefit of
interpersonal comparisons of value in addition to its decoupling ef-
fect. Surely it is fair to conclude that individual X values Blackacre
more than individual Y if X is willing to pay more for Blackacre
than is Y. Unfortunately, however, even money in the economy does
not permit interpersonal comparisons of value: Y might have a high
77. See M. SHUBIK, A GAME-THEORETIC APPROACH To POLITICAL ECONOMY 4-5
(1984).
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personal value for Blackacre that is masked by his poverty or by his
other needs (perhaps Y needs an expensive, life saving operation).
Indeed, a voluntary sale of Blackacre from Y to X tells us nothing
about Y's personal valuation of Backabre vis-a-vis X for precisely the
same reasons.
Nevertheless, Professor Epstein mistakenly believes that a volun-
tary sale moves property to a higher value user,7 8 and it is this non-
existent feature of a voluntary purchase for cash that enamors Pro-
fessor Epstein with the takings clause. Yet, even if a voluntary
exchange did move property to a higher value user, we could not
conclude that the takings clause prevents resource misallocation. Be-
cause a condemnation proceeding does not involve a voluntary ex-
change, we are unable to draw the conclusion Professor Epstein
desires. When the state exercises its power of eminent domain, it
must compensate the property owner with the fair market value of
the property taken. This tells us that the state values the property at
least as highly as does the market, but it tells us nothing about the
state's value vis-a-vis the property owner's. 79 Indeed, the mere fact
that one owns a particular piece of property in preference to all
others of equivalent market value suggests that one's subjective value
of that property exceeds the market price.
For example, suppose P owns Blackacre with fair market value of
$100,000, and suppose further that P is unwilling to sell Blackacre
for less than $120,000. If the state condemns Blackacre and pays P
$100,000 for it, we can make no statement about the relative worth
of Blackacre to the state and to P. All we know is that the state
values Blackacre at $100,000 or more; what we need to know is
whether the state values Blackacre at $120,000 or more.
Return now to Professor Epstein's main argument. He says:
If the losses that state regulation could inflict upon the owner are (as seems
probable) far greater to the owner than the loss of a lateral easement, then
there seems little prospect that the state's offer will be declined. . . . Once
this sequence runs its course, therefore, all we know are the relative values
that the landowner attaches to his two separate interests. We do not know
whether the value of the lateral easement to the state is greater than its
value to the owner, because no accountable political party has been forced
to make that explicit judgment. One central allocative function of the emi-
nent domain clause is effectively bypassed by allowing the state to couple
78. The problem is not that a voluntary exchange might move property to a lower
value user but rather that, because interpersonal comparisons of value make no sense,
there are no "higher" or "lower" value users. Of course, a voluntary exchange does pro-
duce a Pareto superior state (absent externalities), so that voluntary exchanges should be
encouraged as beneficial to society.
79. See R. POSNER, supra note 15, § 3.5, at 42-43.
the lateral easement with the construction permit.80
We now see that "[w]e do not know whether the value of the lateral
easement to the state is greater than its value to the owner" even if
the easement is condemned and paid for, and so Professor Epstein's
support of the opinion in Nollan lacks foundation.
If an economic analysis does not explain Professor Epstein's bless-
ing of the majority opinion in Nollan, what does? One possibility is
simply that the result (if not the opinion) in Nollan is consistent
with a more limited view of the public's power to regulate land use,
a view with which Professor Epstein has expressed strong agree-
ment.81 A second possibility is suggested by Professor Epstein's con-
cluding comments in praise of the Nollan opinion:
The [special interest] groups who are interested in lateral access may be far
less interested in visual access, so that the coalition pressuring for visual
access will disintegrate when the two issues are separated. Chances seem
good that the "public" at large would not want this permit restriction in
and of itself. The severance therefore calls the bluff of the Coastal Com-
mission by preventing it from parlaying a threat of something that interest
groups do not want into acquisition of something they do want-for free.
82
In what sense is the Coastal Commission trying to get the lateral
easement "for free"? The Coastal Commission has offered the land-
owner an exchange, and under the terms of that exchange the cost to
the public of the lateral easement is the visual easement. Professor
Epstein apparently has divined that the visual easement has no value
to the Coastal Commission (or through it to the people of Califor-
nia), but, even if true, does that make it a one-sided exchange? After
all, the landowner is getting precisely what he wants, demonstrating
that what has some value to the Coastal Commission has substantial
value to the landowner.
Professor Epstein's hostility to the Coastal Commission is based, I
suspect, on his supposition that there is a "bluff" to be called. A
"bluff" is a strategic misrepresentation, an action which would be
legitimate were underlying facts otherwise. In this case, Professor
Epstein suspects that if the Coastal Commission were prevented
from conditioning a building permit on the grant of a lateral ease-
ment, the building permit would still be issued and the Commission
would be unwilling to purchase the easement. Thus, the landowner
would obtain the desired permit without payment of the easement.
Traditional contract doctrine tells us that foregoing a legal right is
valid consideration without regard to whether the right otherwise
would be exercised.83 This rule, an application of the more general
80. Epstein, supra note 1, at 62.
81. Id. at 61; see Sax, Book Review, 53 U. Cm. L. REV. 279 (1986) (reviewing R.
EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985).
82. Epstein, supra note 1, at 63 (emphasis added).
83. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 81(1) (1979).
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proposition that courts will inquire into the existence of consideration
but not into its adequacy,8" is firmly based on economic reasoning: so
long as each party gets something that is more valuable to the party
than the thing the party is giving up, the exchange is beneficial.85
Accordingly, whether the Coastal Commission was bluffing should
be, if Professor Epstein's economic analysis is correct, beside the
matter.86 What is significant about this bluffing hypothesis is that
Professor Epstein's condemnation of the Coastal Commission's be-
havior apparently is based upon it. Thus, Professor Epstein's view of
the legitimacy of the Commission's action ultimately turns on its
motive and not just on its actions.
In addition to his failure to expressly consider motivation, Profes-
sor Epstein's analysis of monopolies fails to consider incentive effects.
Super-competitive returns may be the only way to encourage invest-
ment in certain" productive activities. For example, the statutory mo-
nopolies granted by patent and copyright laws are justified by their
incentive effects.8"
Professor Epstein uses the doctrine of "conditional privilege" to
exemplify the problems of monopoly as well as some judicial solu-
tions. Conditional privilege is the right of one in distress to intention-
ally invade the property of another. The property owner has no right
to exclude but is entitled to compensation for any resulting damage.
Professor Epstein interprets the doctrine of conditional privilege as
maintaining the cooperative surplus that the exchange in a competi-
tive market produces.88 Yet, Professor Epstein's theory may result in
84. E.g., Batsakis v. Demotsis, 226 S.W.2d 673 (Texas App. 1949).
85. Cf. R. POSNER, supra note 15, § 4.2, at 88 (To "ask whether the consideration
is adequate would require the court to do what. . . it is less well equipped to do than the
parties-decide whether the price (and other essential terms) specified in the contract
are reasonable.").
86. Actually, the accuracy of Professor Epstein's characterization of the Coastal
Commission's threat as a "bluff" becomes very relevant if we expand the analysis beyond
that of market failures. If in fact the visual easement is of no value to the Coastal Com-
mission, then the exchange of the visual easement for the desired lateral easement can be
condemned as nonproductive. See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
87. See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 15, § 3.2, at 36-37.
88. Professor Epstein writes: "The doctrines of 'conditional privilege,' developed at
common law, are a response to bargaining problems created by the necessity situation
[creating a bilateral monopoly]," citing Ploof v. Putnam, 81 Vt. 471, 71 A.188 (1908),
Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 109 Minn. 456, 124 N.W. 221 (1910), and Bohlen,
Incomplete Privilege to Inflict Intentional Invasions of Interests of Property and Person-
alty, 39 HARV. L. REV. 307 (1926). Epstein, supra note 1, at 18, n.34. Yet, neither of
these cases nor Professor Bohlen's article purports to address "bargaining problems."
Insofar as all remedies for intentional tort concern bargaining problems, the doctrine of
conditional privilege fits Professor Epstein's description. Other than in this overbroad
fewer persons placing themselves in a position to come to the aid of
the distressed and distraught. Thus, a limitation of the price that
drug manufacturers may charge for orphan drugs reduces the availa-
bility of orphan drugs available at any price.8 9
In addition, Professor Epstein once again assumes that paying a
property owner the market rental price for a temporary use of his
property preserves the cooperative surplus of competitive exchange.
Yet, a forced exchange at market prices provides no guarantee of
consumer surplus. We simply cannot know whether the doctrine of
conditional privilege produces any consumer surplus which is not off-
set by producer loss. After all, a risk-averse property owner might
not be willing to accept the market price for his sloop during a
storm. Further, courts applying the conditional privilege doctrine
have never awarded market rent to the property owner, but rather
only compensation for actual damage sustained. Consistent with this
nonmarket approach to the remedy, courts have never justified the
doctrine of conditional privilege in economic terms.
B. Collective Action Market Failure
The problems of collective action identified by Professor Epstein
are the familiar sub-optimal outcomes possible in non-cooperative
games typified by the tragedy of the commons and prisoner's di-
lemma.90 For example, in the prisoner's dilemma two suspects are
picked up by the police on suspicion of breaking and entering and
committing murder. There is sufficient evidence to convict each of
breaking and entering. If neither confesses, each will be sentenced to
five years in prison for breaking and entering. If one suspect con-
fesses and implicates the other, the confessor will be treated leniently
while the other will be convicted of murder. Thus, the confessing
suspect will receive a sentence of three years while the nonconfessing
suspect will receive twenty years. However, if both confess, they will
each be sentenced to ten years, less than a noncooperating witness
but more than a cooperating witness whose testimony is essential to
the state's case. Diagrammatically, these possible outcomes are sum-
marized below. In each case, the first number is the sentence re-
ceived by the suspect who adopts the row strategy while the second
number is the sentence received by the suspects who adopts the col-
umn strategy.
sense, however, there is no support for Professor Epstein's characterization of the
doctrine.
89. See, e.g., C. LINDSAY, supra note 28, at 591-97.
90. See generally P. ORDESHOOK, GAME THEORY AND POLITICAL THEORY 203-42
(1986); H. MARGOLIS, SELFISHNESS, ALTRUISM & RATIONALITY 19-21 (1982).
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Table III
Confess Do Not Confess
Confess 10,10 3,20
Do Not Confess 20,3 5,5
What is counterintuitive about the prisoner's dilemma is that the
optimum individual strategy for each suspect produces a nonop-
timum joint outcome. To see this, consider the opportunity faced by
the row suspect. If, the column suspect does not confess, the row sus-
pect should confess in order to receive the optimum individual sen-
tence of 3 years. But even if the column suspect confesses, the row
suspect should still confess. By confessing, the row suspect receives a
sentence of ten years. The row suspect's failure to confess in this
situation would result in the harshest sentence of twenty years. From
the foregoing analysis, the row suspect should confess regardless of
what he anticipates the column suspect will do. Because the game is
perfectly symmetrical, the column suspect will go through an identi-
cal analysis to reach the same result. Thus, each suspect will confess
and each will receive a senternce of ten years. Yet, both would be
better off if neither confessed, for in that case each would serve only
five years.
There is no reasonable-way for the suspects to reach this desirable
outcome. They may agree not to confess, but once in the interroga-
tion room each serves his best interests by ignoring the agreement
and confessing. If the suspects could make an enforceable agreement
not to confess, they would in fact reach the optimum outcome, but in
the absence of a binding mechanism, only irrational behavior on
both their parts will reach the same result.
When, because of excessive transaction costs or otherwise, parties
are unable to form binding, mutually advantageous agreements, the
prisoner's dilemma problem can arise. However, if the parties can be
forced to honor their agreements, the dilemma is avoided. One way
to force parties to behave in their mutually advantageous way is to
restrict their behavior by statute. Thus, legislative intervention in the
bargaining process may be an effective mechanism for circumventing
the prisoner's dilemma.
Unfortunately, Professor Epstein never identifies a case in which
the problems of collective action have been or should have been the
basis for resolving a systemic coercion problem. To be sure, the
problems of collective action can raise concerns of constitutional
dimensions. For example, a state could improve the welfare of its
citizens by imposing a discriminatory tax on foreign corporations do-
ing business within the state. While such a tax will not be without its
costs to the state-some corporations will eschew doing business
within the state rather than pay the tax-a properly framed tax can
raise more in revenue than is lost through imposition of the tax.
If each state imposes such a discriminatory tax, no state obtains a
net revenue increase, and citizens of each state suffer from the con-
striction in commerce. Yet, if it is difficult for the states to bind
themselves to an agreement eliminating discriminatory taxes and
other trade barriers (because of high transaction costs), each state
will adopt its dominant strategy and, as the prisoner's dilemma sug-
gests, economic balkanization will result. Professor Epstein treats
such a tax as an impermissible exploitation by the state of its mo-
nopoly power to grant or deny foreign corporations permission to do
business within state boundaries. Yet, we have seen that Professor
Epstein's analysis of state monopolies is deficient.
The better answer to the problem of interstate trade wars is the
interstate commerce clause of the Constitution. With few exceptions,
that clause prohibits a state from erecting trade barriers around its
perimeter. One way to avoid the sub-optimal outcome in a prisoner's
dilemma is to provide a way for the prisoners to bind themselves to
act for their mutual advantage. An alternate approach is to bind
them without their consent, and the interstate commerce clause ef-
fectively adopts this latter approach. It is this clause-and not the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions-that responds to state
problems of collective action.
C. Market Failure Externalities
Professor Epstein's discussion of externalities, the third market
failure; is especially problematic. An externality is any cost borne by
nonparties to an activity.9 1 The existence of an externality com-
pletely undermines our ability to characterize a voluntary exchange
as socially beneficial. Although both of the parties to the exchange
benefit from the transaction, the entity bearing the external cost
loses. 2
An actor can be forced to internalize all relevant costs simply by
giving all external cost bearers the right to prohibit the contemplated
activity. In such circumstances the actor will be forced to purchase
91. E.g., A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, supra note 28, at 5. More generally, an exter-
nality (positive or negative) occurs whenever the actions of one agent affect the economic
environment of another other than by affecting prices. H. VARIAN, supra note 36, at 259.
92. In theory, virtually every exchange will produce one or more externalities. For
example, if I exchange my labor for my employer's cash, anyone who is jealous of my
salary bears an externality cost of the exchange. Similarly, those who believe prostitu-
tion, alcohol consumption, or recreational drugs are immoral likely suffer whenever some-
one engages in these activities, and that suffering is an externality of the activity.
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all relevant permissions, and the price paid for these permissions is
precisely the internalization of what would otherwise be an external-
ity. The advantage of forcing an actor to internalize all costs is that
if the actively is then done, we know that society as a whole is better
off as a result.
Because the touchstone of an externality is an uncompensated cost
imposed on a nonparty, Professor Epstein's definition of an external-
ity is confusing. Professor Epstein initially defines an exchange gen-
erating an externality as "[a]ny contract between A and C that al-
lowed A to take B's property," assuming that A is not entitled to
take the property of B without B's consent. 93 Such a definition of an
externality is not correct because B's property rights-that is, B's
rights protected by law-cannot be expropriated without compensa-
tion. Externalities-costs imposed on third parties-are of necessity
uncompensated costs imposed on third parties.94
Having defined externalities to include far too many costs, Profes-
sor Epstein than ignores his definition in favor of one that is too
restrictive. The excessive narrowness of Professor Epstein's opera-
tional definition of an "externality" is revealed in his discussion of
Snepp v. United States.95 In Snepp, the Supreme Court held that the
CIA could hold a former agent to the letter of an agreement he had
signed with the agency in which he promised not to disclose any in-
formation relating to the agency without prior approval. Professor
Epstein supports the decision, writing:
Any breach of the system of prior clearances creates the risk of improper
disclosure, which can only undermine the ability of the CIA to obtain
needed information from sources that rely on the review process for protec-
tion .... [I]t is difficult to see how the public is ill-served by ensuring
confidentially of its intelligence agents.0 6
Professor Epstein's analysis of Snepp begins and ends with a consid-
eration of monopoly: because the federal government employs only a
small fraction of the labor pool, it cannot be said to have significant
monopoly power.97
93. Epstein, supra note 1, at 21.
94. Of course, to the extent that compensation is less than full, a compensated
third-party effect would be better characterized as partially a compensated and partially
an uncompensated externality.
95. 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam).
96. Epstein, supra note 1, at 69. The excised material includes the assertion that
"[t]he restriction in question is no doubt similar to ones private employers impose upon
employees entrusted with sensitive information." It seems far from obvious that private
employers regularly seek to impose a right of complete censorship for an indefinite time.
97. Id. at 68; see also Easterbrook, supra note 9, at 349.
Yet, even if Snepp does not involve a monopoly problem, it does
involve an externality. The externality overlooked by Professor Ep-
stein is the loss to the public through violation of Snepp's right to
publish his story: loss of the public's right to read the story. Assum-
ing aguendo that the CIA can be said to have bargained for the
right to censor Snepp's book when it offered Snepp a job, that bar-
gain should be subject to judicial scrutiny because of the loss it im-
posed on the public.
Once again, Professor Epstein falls back on divined legislative mo-
tivation. He asserts that any CIA pre-publication censorship based
not on an attempt to protect classified information but instead on an
attempt to stifle criticism of the agency "can be handled on a case-
by-case basis . . . without disturbing the basic structure of the stat-
ute." '98 Unfortunately, that assertion simply is wrong; the statutory
condition imposed on the agent as a condition of his employment was
not limited to protection of classified information or other sensitive
materials.9 The CIA sought the right to censor as it saw fit. 100 This
was the statutory choice forced on Snepp. Because Professor Epstein
finds no constitutional impediment to the forced choice, uncon-
strained censorship is what Professor Epstein would allow. Indeed, as
to the particular facts in Snepp, Professor Epstein concludes: "The
bargain here does not seem to be a cloak for any hidden government
abuse." A more cynical individual might wonder whether the CIA's
attempted censorship might represent a bureaucratic attempt to hide
blunders or abuses of power.
Professor Epstein's analysis to the contrary notwithstanding,
Snepp is a case in which systemic coercion raises an externality
problem. Because restriction of the first amendment right to free
speech affects not only potential speakers but also potential listeners,
the CIA's attempt to censor its agents' rights imposes an externality
on the general public. That externality justifies judicial scrutiny of
the bargain struck by the CIA and Snepp. 0 1
98. Epstein, supra note 1, at 69.
99. The government conceded that no information in Snepp's book was classified.
444 U.S. at 510 & n.4.
100. The contractual obligation of Snepp was to not publish any information con-
cerning the CIA or its activities without prior approval. 444 U.S. at 507-08. The Court
wrote that "[t]he government does not deny-as a general principle-Snepp's right to
publish unclassified information." Id. at 511. Yet, as Justice Stevens made clear in dis-
sent, that principle, if applied by the Court, would have resulted in a different outcome.
See id. at 521 n.11 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Because the government conceded that
Snepp's book contained no sensitive information, id. at 510, the case was distinguishable
from United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1063 (1972), in which the government claimed only that an agent had violated his agree-
ment by publishing classified information.
101. The dissent did not challenge the CIA's right to protect sensitive information
from exposure but rather argued that if, in fact, no sensitive information was published
in Snepp's book, Snepp's breach of his duty to submit to pre-publication review caused
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In an article cited with approval by Professor Epstein, Professor
Easterbrook has argued nevertheless that Snepp was properly de-
cided.1"2 Professor Easterbrook concedes that the doctrine of uncon-
stitutional conditions has a role to play in controlling externalities,'03
but he found no externality worth worrying about in the case. What
about the public's right to listen to what Snepp had to say? Professor
Easterbrook observes that individual constitutional rights can be sold
and are sold all the time. 04 He then asserts that the public's right to
know is "a mere by-product of the First Amendment right to
speak."'1 5 From these two propositions he concludes that "a 'right to
listen' is incomprehensible unless someone first possesses a right to
speak and a desire to do so. Snepp had the desire after he quit the
CIA, but he long ago surrendered his full right."'0 6
Yet, the precise issue before the Court was whether Snepp had
"long ago surrendered his full right" to speak freely. The economic
argument in favor of Snepp is that we protect Snepp's First Amend-
ment right to speak in order to protect the public's right to listen.
Professor Easterbrook's reasoning becomes circular when he then re-
jects the public's right to listen on the ground that Snepp personally
had no right to speak.
117
Professor Easterbrook's analysis is more applicable to cases such
as McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford.08 In that case, the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court faced a challenge to a municipal
regulation forbidding police officers from soliciting funds for political
purposes. While recognizing that the right to solicit funds for politi-
cal purposes is protected by the First Amendment, the Court re-
the government no damage. See 444 U.S. at 516-26 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
102. Easterbrook, supra note 9, at 339-52 (cited in Epstein, supra note 1, at 14
n.31 & 68 n.184).
103. Easterbrook, supra note 9, at 349.
104. Id. at 346-47.
105. Id. at 351.
106. Id. at 352 (footnote omitted).
107. Circular reasoning is a common charge in this area of the law. See, e.g., id. at
352. Probably the best explanation for Professor Easterbrook's support of the decision in
Snepp is his failure to appreciate the true extent of the externality. Professor Easterbrook
writes that the CIA's ability to censor Snepp under his agreement extended only to the
protection of classified information. Yet, that was the position of the dissent in Snepp.
The majority was willing to let the agency be the judge of what information should not
be revealed by its agents. That the agency might try to conceal legitimate criticism is
precisely what Snepp was about. Cf. United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990
(W.D. Wis. 1979), in which the government sought pre-publication censorship of a mag-
azine article describing how to construct a hydrogen bomb even though all information in
the article was available in the public domain.
108. 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
jected application of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, saying:
The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no
constitutional right to be a policeman. There are few employments for hire
in which the servant does not agree to suspend his constitutional rights of
free speech as well as of idleness by the implied terms of the contract. The
servant cannot complain, as he takes the employment on the terms which
are offered him. On the same principle the city may impose any reasonable
condition upon holding offices within its control. This condition seems to us
reasonable, if that be a question open to revision here.0 9
McAuliffe is similar to Snepp in that each cases involves a govern-
ment employment contract requiring the waiver of a First Amend-
ment right as a condition of employment. McAuliffe, though,
presents no apparent externality: the general public has little interest
in Officer McAuliffe ability to solicit funds for political purposes.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in a series of cases has fully re-
jected the reasoning of Justice Holmes in McAuliffe despite the ab-
sence of any externality.
In Garrity v. New Jersey,110 a police officer was asked to testify
before an agency investigating police misconduct. Officer Garrity
was informed of his privilege against self-incrimination but was told
that his exercise of that right would result in automatic dismissal.
Garrity choose to testify, and his testimony subsequently was used
against him in a conspiracy prosecution."'
Officer Garrity challenged the use of his statements against him,
saying that he had been forced to give up his right against self-in-
crimination. Although the state argued that the waiver was valid
under Justice Holmes's "greater includes the lesser theory," the
Court explicitly rejected this reasoning, saying "[t]he question. .. is
not cognizable in those terms.""' 2 According to the Court, "[t]here
are rights of constitutional stature whose exercise a State may not
109. Id. at 220, 29 N.E. at 517-18; accord, Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678
(1888). Professor Epstein characterizes Justice Holmes as "dismiss[ing] the entire doc-
trine of unconstitutional conditions as a logical and conceptual error." Epstein, supra
note 1, at 8 n.10, citing Justice Holmes's dissenting opinion in Western Union Tel. Co. v.
Kansas, 216 U.S. 1, at 53-55 (1909). To be sure, Justice Holmes applies the "greater
includes the lesser" theory in a variety of contexts to reject unconstitutional conditions
challenges. See, e.g., Ferry v. Ramsey, 277 U.S. 88, 94 (1928). See generally Van Al-
styne, supra note 2. Nonetheless, Justice Holmes had little difficulty ignoring the
"greater includes the lesser" reasoning when it seemed appropriate to do so. See Silsbee
v. Webber, 171 Mass. 378, 381, 50 N.E. 555, 556 (1898) ("When it comes to the collat-
eral question of obtaining a contract by threats, it does not follow that, because you
cannot be made to answer for the act, you may use the threat."). Surprisingly, Professor
Epstein seems to agree that the right to do an act does not necessarily permit one to
threaten the act to elicit a payment for refraining to act. Epstein, Blackmail, Inc., 50 U.
CHI. L. Rv. 553, 558 n.7 (1983). But see Epstein, Unconscionability" A Critical Ap-
praisal, 18 J. LAW & ECON. 293, 297 (1975).
110. 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
111. Id. at 495.
112. Id. at 499.
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condition by the exaction of a price."113
Garrity and the several cases that followed it"14 are best under-
stood as expressing equal protection concerns." 5 Exercise of consti-
tutional rights should remain unburdened absent an important state
interest."16 Even when there is no direct public interest in the exer-
cise of an individual's right, there is a general public interest in see-
ing constitutional rights enjoyed. The state has no legitimate interest
in minimizing the exercise of constitutional rights. Systemic coercion
will present true externality problems whenever the right involved is
one whose individual exercise significantly affects the general public.
For example, Snepp's First Amendment right to speak formed the
basis of the public's right to know, so that the CIA's attempt to co-
erce Snepp's "waiver" threatened to impose significant costs on the
general public.
A similar situation might arise if a state sought to interfere with
the right to vote. Suppose that public housing is made available only
on condition that recipients agree not to vote in statewide elections. -
Should this systemic coercion be upheld? The effect of this law pre-
sumably is to skew subsequent state elections in favor of current of-
fice holders. Because a waiver of the right to vote affects not only the
government of the person who waives the right but also those who do
not, the waiver imposes an externality on the general citizenry. Ac-
cordingly, the coercion should be invalidated absent some compelling
justification for its existence.
II. RETHINKING UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS
Professor Epstein's analysis of systemic coercion is premised on
the mainstay of economic reasoning that a voluntary exchange be-
tween consenting individuals makes both parties better off. Further-
more, if there are no negative third party effects from the transac-
tion, then we can conclude that the exchange makes society better
off in the very strong Pareto sense. However, the societal and indi-
113. Id. at 500.
114. Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968); Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n
v. Commissioner of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280 (1968); Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70
(1973); Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801 (1977); see also Spevak v. Klein, 385
U.S. 511 (1967) (plurality opinion). See generally Coffee, Twisting Slowly in the Wind.
A Search for Constitutional Limits on Coercion of the Criminal Defendant, 1980 Sup.
CT. REV. 211, 216-17.
115. See Abrams, supra note 7, at 140-42.
116. See, e.g., Rosenthal, supra note 14, at 1152-55; Sullivan, supra note 8, at
1503-05.
vidual benefits flowing from exchange only obtain if the exchange
involves productive activity; if the exchange is nonproductive, the ex-
change will not lead to a Pareto-superior world.
For example, when I buy your product, I do so because your prod-
uct is worth more to me than its cost. Similarly, when you buy my
product, you do so because you value my product more than its cost.
If we agree to exchange products, we each gain by the excess of the
value received over the value given, where these valuations are sub-
jective and individualistic. If we are forbidden from exchanging our
products, we are both worse off. Thus, the exchange is productive in
the sense that (assuming there are no negative externalities) the
wealth of 'society is increased by the exchange.
Consider a very different type of exchange. Suppose B is aware of
V's sordid past and threatens to tell T, V's fiancee, unless V pays B
not to do so. That is, suppose that B blackmails V. Assuming that
B's silence is worth the blackmail price to V, is the payment of
blackmail by V in exchange for B's silence a productive activity?
117
The exchange is mutually beneficial to B and to V in the sense
that both are better off agreeing to it than in refusing it. That fact,
standing alone, only tells us that, if permitted, the exchange should
take place. To determine whether the exchange is truly productive,
we must ask whether both parties are worse off if blackmail is
prohibited.
What B is selling is his silence, and if blackmail is prohibited V
will obtain B's silence without paying for it. To be sure, even if
blackmail is prohibited, B will have the right to reveal V's past to T,
but B will have no incentive to do so. Indeed, a blackmailer never
has an incentive to reveal the victim's secrets, even if the demand for
blackmail is refused, other than to give credibility to future demands
for blackmail. Thus, so long as future blackmail is known to be pro-
hibited with certainty, the blackmailer's threats can be rejected with
impunity." 8
117. Professor Nozick first observed that blackmail is a nonproductive exchange.
R. NozIcK. ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 84-87 (1974). This view has recently come
under attack. Block & Gordon, Blackmail, Extortion and Free Speech: A Reply to Pos-
ner, Epstein and Lindgren, 19 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 37, 47-50 (1985). However, this attack
seems to be premised on the assumption that the prohibition of blackmail would en-
courage the dissemination of V's secrets. See id. at 49. But see M. ROTHBARD, THE
ETHICS OF LIBERTY 242 (1982) (noting that the assumption seems to apply only to the
pathological and to gossip mongers). See supra note 118.
118. I am excluding from consideration both those blackmailers who obtain some
pathological enjoyment from hurting others as well as those, such as gossip columnists,
for whom revealing secrets is an occupation. For these two groups, blackmail is a produc-
tive exchange because each side gives up something valuable in exchange for something
even more valuable. As to these blackmailers, were the exchange prohibited the secrets
would be revealed. For all other blackmailers, the threat behind blackmail is credible
only as a response to what Professor Frank has called the "commitment problem." See
R. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON 1-3 & 4-5 (1988).
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Because B has no incentive to reveal V's secrets absent the possi-
bility of collecting blackmail, V is better off if blackmail is prohib-
ited than if it is allowed. That is not to say that V should necessarily
reject the blackmail if offered by B and if it is permitted; paying
blackmail certainly may be better than rejecting it. What we can
say, though, is that even if paying blackmail makes V better off than
rejecting it, the prohibition of blackmail makes V better still. The
blackmail exchange is thus nonproductive in the sense that one of
the two parties to the exchange would prefer that the exchange be
prohibited ab initio. Because the threat underlying blackmail has no
value to B independent of its threat potential, V's paying to void B's
threat is nonproductive.119
At least in some circumstances, systemic coercion fits nicely into
this blackmail mold.120 For example, reconsider the approach taken
by Professor Epstein in his analysis of the Nollan case. Recall that
in Nollan the Coastal Commission offered to exchange a viewing
easement for a lateral easement. Professor Epstein argued that the
Coastal Commission had no interest in maintaining the public's right
to a viewing easement of the ocean but, rather, threatened to insist
on that easement only so that it could be exchanged for the lateral
easement that the Commission truly desired. If in fact Professor Ep-
stein is correct that the Commission had no interest in the viewing
easement, then we can condemn the transaction as nonproductive be-
cause the viewing easement would be valuable to the Commission
only as a threat to obtain the lateral easement.
This analogy to blackmail can be taken only so far. Unless we can
say with certainty that the systemic coercion is based on a threat the
government would not want to carry out, we cannot condemn the
systemic coercion as unproductive. Professor Epstein was thus cor-
rect when he emphasized administrative motivation in his analysis of
119. Why is blackmail condemned? In the individual case, the payment of black-
mail as exchange for silence is a wealth-maximizing transaction: the victim would rather
pay than suffer exposure. The system as a whole is not profit-maximizing, however, be-
cause if the payment of blackmail is altogether prohibited, victims gain and blackmailers
lose. A world with blackmail is thus neither Pareto-superior nor Pareto-inferior to one
without blackmail, so that economics cannot tell us to prefer one to the other. Ulti-
mately, we condemn blackmail because we do not wish to reward those whose profit-
seeking activity is not socially productive. The touchstone of a socially-unproductive ex-
change is one in which one of the parties would prefer that the exchange by systemati-
cally prohibited.
120. Cf. Easterbrook, supra note 9, at 348 (doctrine of unconstitutional conditions
may be understood as prohibiting a forced choice that leaves the recipient of the offer
worse off than before).
Nollan. His only error was in failing to admit that administrative
motivation was the linchpin of his condemnation, an admission that
would have undercut his claim to a "functional, not intuitive" solu-
tion to the problem.
An alternative way to understand systemic coercion is to look at it
from the perspective of the government rather than that of the vic-
tim. In this light, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is a re-
sponse to a monitoring problem. A representative democracy, like a
publicly-held corporation, is run by one group of individuals for the
benefit of another group. And public officials, like corporate manag-
ers, have their own interests as well as those of their constituents in
mind.
In the commercial context, the existence and magnitude of corpo-
rate profits allow shareholders to monitor manager behavior without
serious difficulty. To be sure, the existence of a favorable corporate
bottom line is no evidence that corporate managers have consciously
acted solely or even predominantly on behalf of shareholder inter-
ests. It might be, for example, that the managers have sought to
serve only their own interests but coincidentally those ends also serve
the shareholders. Or it might be that manager and shareholder inter-
ests diverge but that selfish managers also turn out to be clumsy
managers, and that in trying to serve their own ends the managers
have actually benefited the shareholders.
The existence of corporate profits demonstrates that manage-
ment's actions have benefited the shareholders. And so long as those
profits are competitively high, that is all the shareholders demand.
Because a corporation is formed to make money, success of the en-
terprise is judged by the amount of money it makes.
The success or failure of public officials is less easy to determine
because the goals of the public enterprise are less well defined. There
is no profit statement, no bottom line, to which voters may turn to
measure the effectiveness of their representatives. Rather, each indi-
vidual voter must measure the effectiveness of public officials on is-
sues important to that voter. To some, the federal deficit may be
most important; to others, local unemployment may be. For most
voters a variety of issues will be important, and each voter will want
to rank each official on each of these issues.
Furthermore, these individualistic litmus tests have no natural
scale against which to measure results and no obvious way to com-
bine different results into an overall average. Because there are hun-
dreds or thousands of goals toward which government action might
be directed, the success of public officials inevitably will be cloudy
rather than all dark or all light. As a result, monitoring the behavior
of public officials is time-consuming and expensive. Nevertheless, in
theory, each voter should determine how successful each official has
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been as compared with available alternatives and then vote accord-
ingly. Officials who put their own interests ahead of the interests of
their constituents should eventually be put out of office unless they,
like the lucky or clumsy corporate manager, accidentally happen to
serve the public without trying. Thus, even in the absence of a bot-
tom-line or other objective measure of government success, each
voter can in theory monitor representative behavior by comparing
what the representatives do with what the voter would prefer to have
done.
While accountability to constituents serves to limit official misbe-
havior in a variety of ways,'21 it cannot help to enforce those limita-
tions on official behavior intended to protect political minorities from
majority tyranny. Legislators and other public officials hostile to con-
stitutional rights may serve their constituents while retaining their
hostility."22 It falls to the judiciary to protect these rights from popu-
list attack. Yet, because there is no objective standard by which to
measure the performance of public officials, it is virtually impossible
for judges to say with certainty that one action or another would be
desired by various political minorities.' 23
For example, suppose a state passes a statute providing that pro-
bation for convicted criminals is available only to those who plead
guilty. On the one hand, such a statute might be defended as an
attempt to limit probation to those defendants who, by visibly ac-
cepting responsibility for their crimes, are less likely than others to
repeat their offenses. On the other hand, the statute might reflect a
basic legislative animosity toward the rights of criminal defendants
and an attempt to do indirectly that which cannot be done directly.
Should the legislation be invalidated?
Because the possible flaw with the legislation does not concern its
reach or effect but rather its underlying motivation, no objective test
can be determinative, and economic analysis can offer no guidance.
121. While the extraordinarily high reelection rate of the members of Congress
may reflect a failure in the monitoring of public officials, that datum also is consistent
with the opposite conclusion: it may be that members of Congress are so well policed by
their constituents that they consistently avoid stepping over those bounds that are impor-
tant to the voters.
122. See Epstein, supra note 1, at 54.
123. All things being equal, a direct payment to the members constituting a spe-
cific minority group ought to be desirable to that minority group, and a direct tax im-
posed only on the members of that minority group ought to be undesirable. Rarely
though will the actions of a public official be so one dimensional. For example, the free
distribution of clean needles to heroin addicts does not unambiguously help heroin ad-
dicts: it helps avoid AIDS, but may encourage continued drug dependency.
To be sure, economic analysis may have something to offer if we
focus on objective proxies for motivation. Thus, if the avowed pur-
pose of a piece of legislation can be achieved more efficiently or with
greater regard for constitutional rights, it might be appropriate to
strike down the legislation as unnecessarily invasive. 124 But if the fo-
cus of the decision really is motivation, economic analysis cannot be
helpful. Even if the law appears to be an irrational attempt to ac-
complish legitimate goals, we cannot say for certain that the avowed
purpose masks some malignant motivation-it might just be a lousy
law written by incompetent legislators.
Unfortunately, legislative motivation is not only difficult to dis-
cover but difficult even to define. 125 To be sure, legislative histories
sometimes shed light on the goals of a statute, but courts under-
standably have been reluctant to invalidate legislation simply be-
cause a legislator said the wrong thing or failed to say the right
thing.126 Further, it takes an extraordinary leap of faith to read the
words of one legislator and treat them as the words of all. Indeed, a
likely motivation behind the passage of many bills through Congress
may be the desire to do a colleague a favor or even the desire to get
home.
The problems of potential agent misfeasance are illustrated by the
employment cases. Reconsider the Snepp case in which the CIA
sought to enforce a right of pre-publication censorship agreed to by
agent Snepp as part of the standard CIA employment contract. 1 7
While it is certainly true that Snepp agreed to the CIA's censorship
when he joined the agency, it is at least reasonable to question why
he was asked to do so.
Certainly the CIA has a legitimate interest in protecting classified
information. A right in the agency of pre-publication review might
be a legitimate way to protect that interest.""8 But in Snepp the
agency sought more. It did not argue that any of the material pub-
lished by Snepp was classified. Rather, it argued only that Snepp's
actions subjected sensitive information to an unacceptable "risk of
disclosure."'12 9
Are we willing to accept the proposition that the CIA should have
an unrestricted right to determine what constitutes sensitive mate-
rial? Professor Epstein claims without support that the pre-publica-
tion review demanded of Snepp by the CIA "is no doubt similar to
124. See Abrams, supra note 7, at 147-49.
125. See Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law,
79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970).
126. See Abrams, supra note 7, at 144.
127. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
128. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3 (1980).
129. Id. at 511.
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ones private employers impose upon employees entrusted with sensi-
tive information."' 30 Presumably he is likening Snepp's case to those
involving trade secrets or business opportunities improperly appropri-
ated by company employees. 1' 1
The important distinction is that the typical trade secret case does
not risk hiding information of official misconduct, information which
the public has a vital interest to know. Would an employment agree-
ment be upheld if it prohibited a corporate employee from informing
shareholders of officer or director misconduct? That, at least, is a
possible interpretation of the CIA's employment agreement with
Snepp, and the Court's holding in Snepp deprives the beneficial own-
ers of such information (the general public) of the right to obtain it.
III. CONCLUSION
We have seen that problems of systemic coercion inevitably turn
on legislative and administrative motivation. Condemning some prof-
fered exchange of a government benefit for the waiver of a constitu-
tional right is appropriate only after a court somehow determines
that the avowed purpose of the condition is either a ruse or is insuffi-
cient to justify burdening a constitutional right. How a court reaches
or rejects this conclusion is difficult to predict. Professor Kreimer
suggests, but ultimately rejects, "anthropomorphiz[ing] the govern-
mental entity in question, treating it as an individual and applying to
it the common sense tests by which courts interpret the purposes of
persons."'' 32 While objective guideposts exist, 33 surely most determi-
nations of motivation will turn on judicial hunches and intuition.
Having failed to find Professor Epstein's "functional, not intui-
tive" solution, have we also failed to understand systemic coercion
and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine established to restrict
it? Not necessarily. Failure is defined as much by what we hope for
as by what we achieve. Professor Epstein's search for mechanical
certainty-in particular, his search for certainty via economic analy-
sis-may itself be misguided.' Almost seventy years ago, Justice
Cardozo wrote of his search for certainty in the law:
130. Epstein, supra note 1, at 69.
131. Professor Easterbrook treated Snepp in precisely this light. See Easterbrook,
supra note 9.
132. Kreimer, supra note 49, at 1335.
133. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 7, at 146-55.
134. Cf. Rosenthal, supra note 14, at 1161 ("As with most difficult, and therefore
interesting legal questions, the answer is not 'always' or 'never', but 'sometimes' or 'it
depends.' ").
I was much troubled in spirit, in my first years upon the bench, to find how
trackless was the ocean on which I had embarked. I sought for certainty. I
was oppressed and disheartened when I found that the quest for it was fu-
tile. I was trying to reach land, the solid land of fixed and settled rules, the
paradise of justice that would declare itself by tokens plainer and more
commanding than its pale and glimmering reflections in my own vacillating
mind and conscience. . . . As the years have gone by, and as I have re-
flected more and more upon the nature of the judicial process, I have be-
come reconciled to the uncertainty, because I have grown to see it as inevi-
table. I have grown to see that the process in its highest reaches is not
discovery, but creation; and that the doubts and misgivings, the hopes and
fears, and part of the travail of mind, the pangs of death and the pangs of
birth, in which principles that have served their day expire, and new princi-
ples are born.
1 3 5
Economic analysis as we know it today, though often useful and oc-
casionally almost insistent, is no more a panacea, no more stable, no
more close to eternal truth than was Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social
Statics131 or the luminiferous ether.
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